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THE PERPETUAL ANXIETY OF LIVING
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Ethan J. Leib*
It certainly seems like the originalists are winning. Professor
Jack Balkin-finding that he couldn't beat 'em-joined them.1
Living constitutionalists used to turn to Balkin as a reliable advocate; he recently wrote "we are all living constitutionalists
now." 2 But Balkin has forsaken them. Losing such an important
advocate might be a sign that what some once deemed the "ascendant" and dominant theory in constitutional interpretation is
on the decline.3 Still, don't count living constitutionalism out of
the game just yet-and don't think one can embrace Balkin's

approach and a true living constitutionalism at the same time.
We have before us in Balkin's new constitutional theory a
lefty originalism to join another prominent conception of the
same propounded by Balkin's colleague, Akhil Amar.4 Lefty
* Associatc Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings Collcge of thc
Law. Thanks to Myron Schonfeld, Jack Balkin, Bruce Ackerman, Dan Markel, Tali
Farhadian, Chris Green, Patrick O'Donnell, Paul Horwitz, and Rick Garnett For cngagcmcnt on the themes devcloped herc.
1. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291
(2007).
2. Jack M. Balkin, Why No One Truly Believes in a Dead Constitution, SLATE,
Aug. 29, 2115, http://www.slate.comlid2125226.
3. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 853
(1989) ("Those who have not delved into the scholarly writing on constitutional law for
several years may he unaware of the explicitness with which many prominent and respected commentators reject the original meaning of the Constitution as an authoritative
guide."); Jonathan R. Maccy, Originalism as an 'Ism', 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 301,
301 (1996) ("A mong constitutional law scholars at elite schools, the idea of being an
originalist is tantamount to being some sort (if intellectual Ludditc."). But see Sanford
Levinson, The Limited Relevance of Originalism in the Actual Performance of Legal
Roles, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 495, 495 (1996) ("[AIlmost everyone is an originalist
in at least some limited sense."); Michael J.Perry, The Legitimacy of ParticularConceptions of ConstitutionalInterpretation,77 VA. L. REV. 669, 687 (1991) ("It seems difficult,
in American political-legal culture, to make a persuasive case (or nonoriginalism ....
That difficulty helps to explain why it is so hard to locate a real, live nonoriginalist,
whether judge or, even, academic theorist.").
4. See Akhil Reed Amar, Rethinking Originalism:Original Intent for Liberals (and
for Conservatives and Moderates, Too), SLATE, Sept. 21, 21115, http://www.slatc.com/idl
21266810. Some charge another colleague, Bruce Ackerman, with the title too. See Suz-

HeinOnline -- 24 Const. Comment. 353 2007

354

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 24:353

originalism, however, is not some new Yale invention! Hugo
Black and John Hart Ely might be part of its old guard. Still,
Balkin's coming-out as a lefty originalist now self-consciously
aims to bury living constitutionalism as an independent theory
and disarm its power. Balkin tells us that the choice between
"originalism" and "living constitutionalism" is overdrawn and
"rests upon a false dichotomy." He argues that we must maintain
fidelity to the original meaning of the document-but that fidelity is achieved by committing to the original meaning of "text
and principle" rather than to the "original expected application"
of those texts and principles. The former is "binding law" and
the latter is not. Once we embrace this distinction, Balkin contends, we can retain the flexibility and adaptability that underwrites what he takes to be living constitutionalism's agenda and
simultaneously pledge allegiance to an original meaning originalism. His final result is an impressively original and respectably
originalist defense of abortion rights under the United States
Constitution.
But why are the Constitution and its original principles
binding, again? And is living constitutionalism really dead after
Balkin's coup de grace (or is it a coup d'6tat)? An anxious approach to the first question should lead to a negative answer to
the second. In short, living constitutionalism's core animating
anxiety is that the Constitution (and most especially its original
meaning) may not be binding-and that anxiety leads to interpretive mechanics that are fundamentally in tension with the interpretive mechanics that originalists prefer.' On this important
measure, Balkin is now an originalist through and through; and
living constitutionalism remains alive as a real alternative. Living
constitutionalism is more than a pedestrian desire for flexibility
and adaptability, an excuse for nominally liberal results, and an

anna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918, 933 (1992) ("Ackcrman's theory is merely originalism flying under liberal colors."). But see Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007) (arguing for a lorm olliving constitutionalism).
5. Although I can't spell out the differences in this context, what I'm calling
"lefty" originalism is rather different from what Timothy Sandcfur has recently called
"liberal originalism." See Timothy Sandelur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for Our Future,
27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489 (21)04).

6. Throughout this essay, 1 am clearly generalizing about living constitutionalism-and making a claim about its psychology that is, admittedly, somewhat hard to verify. One could undoubtedly find people who purport to be living constitutionalists and
desire only flexibility in interpretation. These people may, after all, be satisfied with
Balkin's considerable achievements and may be willing to become Balkinizcd originalists.
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attempt to have a "conversation between the generations" about
vague and ambiguous clauses in the Constitution.
I want to focus here on a relatively underdeveloped aspect
of Balkin's paper: his quick dismissal of living constitutionalism
and his underlying assumption that living constitutionalists will
be able to embrace his approach without difficulty. To be sure,
many originalists will read Balkin to be a living constitutionalist
in disguise-and may not let him into their club, notwithstanding
his bona fides as an adept historian of the Fourteenth Amendment. But my main thesis here is that Balkin should no longer be
welcomed by the living constitutionalists, despite his claim to be
meeting their fundamental needs.'
Balkin's discussion engages originalists, first and foremost.
Although he devotes substantial effort to rejecting an "original
expected applications originalism," he still aims to demonstrate
his street credibility as an originalist. Indeed, living constitutionalists get little more than a passing mention in Balkin's paean to
original meaning. We get no real flavor of what a coherent account of living constitutionalism might look like-nor how
Balkin's approach might leave living constitutionalists satisfied
that his unifying theory meets their concerns. It may be that the
very metaphor of a living constitution is full of "teasing imprecision," as former Chief Justice Rehnquist once wrote.' But once I
explicate a bit about living constitutionalism here (or one variant
7. This club and those who try to explain it hardly even appear in Balkin's account
that purports to dismiss it. Some relatively well-known sources would likely include
HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION: A CONSIDERATION OF THE
REALITIES AND LEGENDS OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1927); EDWARD S. CORWIN,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (Alpheus Mason & Gerald Garvey eds., 1964);
EDWARD S. CORWIN, TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934); Edward S. Corwin,
Constitution v. Constitutional Theory, 19 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 290 (1925); Charles A.
Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673 (1963);
Charles Beard, The Living Constitution, 185 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC.
SC. 29 (1936); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433 (1986); HERMAN BELZ, A LIVING
CONSTITUTION

OR

FUNDAMENTAL

LAW'?:

AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONALISM

IN

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1998); Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional
Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the "Living Constitution" in the Course of'
American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 191 (1997); Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Women Suffragists and the "Living Constitution," 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456
(21101). An exciting new statement can he found in Ackerman, supra note 4.
My reconstruction of living constitutionalism here is very selective-and imposcs a
particular perspective on a broad-ranging group of jurists, many of whom could reasonably contest my account. The purpose here is only to show how a central form of living
constitutionalism remains an important alternative to Balkin's approach.
8. William Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693,
693 (1976). For a recent philosophical discussion of the metaphor, see Aileen Kavanagh,
The Idea of a Living Constitution, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 55 (2113).
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thereof), I should be able to establish how Balkin's "text and
principle" methodology fails to accommodate fully the center of
living constitutionalism. Original meaning originalism and living
constitutionalism are hardly, as Balkin concludes, "opposite
sides of the same coin." Indeed, they trade in different currencies.
Under any reading of originalism, lefty or otherwise, history
is its main currency.' First-order constitutional interpretation is a
project of uncovering some historical truth or reconstruction
about the text and structure of the Constitution. In this regard,
Balkin's originalism is no different from any other: the original
public meaning at the time of ratification is at the core of the
theory and it achieves a privileged position in Balkin's interpretive project. Although this is not always perfectly clear in
Balkin's discussion of his theory, I take him to be distinguishing
between the "text and principles" that are to be derived only
from their original historical meaning-which he deems immutable and binding-and the "application and implementation"
thereof-which can change with the times. Tying the text and
principles to the historical fact of the matter is his basic concession to originalism, whereas his flexibility in application and implementation is his attempt to incorporate living constitutionalism.
Different kinds of originalists, however, admit different
modalities of constitutional interpretation into constitutional decision-making in further iterations of the interpretive process. 1
So Scalia's "faint-hearted" originalism, to take a widely9. For a fuller account, onc would have to specily the scope of the history that can
be admitted in pursuing the original meaning of a provision. For my purposes here, I assume that most originalists prefer, in the first instance, an investigation into the original
public meanings of constitutional provisions-as their ratifiers would have understood
them.
One could, however, take a broader view of the constitutional history that is relevant in constitutional interpretation-and still maintain focus on history as such. This is,
perhaps, the strategy of Barry Friedman and Scott B. Smith, who sclf-consciously look
for a "third way" between originalism and living constitutionalism. See Barry Friedman
& Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998).
10. A useful set of the modalities of constitutional interpretation comes from
PHILIP C. BOBBITI', CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION

3-119

(1982); PHILIP BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13-14 (1991). It includes
text, history, structure, doctrine, ethical considerations, and prudential considerations.
Bobbit argues that the set is "legitimate" insofar as the Supreme Court uses each modality in its
dccision-making processes. In short, my thesis here is that originalists and living
constitutionalists differ on which modalities to admit into the interpretive process and
when. And because of this difference, Balkin's approach cannot so easily dismiss the dichotomy between his lefty originalism and a faithful account of living constitutionalism.
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discussed example, yields to precedent and prudential considerations occasionally." Randy Barnett's theory of "constitutional
construction" helps fill the gaps left over after first-order
originalism does its work and vagueness remains. 2 And Balkin's
original meaning originalism, though self-consciously rather different from Scalia's originalism and Barnett's construction, also
allows different modalities to fill out and apply the "text and
principles" in a conceptually later stage of constitutional interpretation. Balkin's rights to abortion have their roots in historical excavation-that is where the original meaning of the principles comes from. But the principles gain flesh and heft through a
variety of constitutional modalities that help "translate" the
principles (with fidelity, fit, and justification) for our time.
Balkin's specification and translation of his "text and principles"
may depart too far from original meaning for some originalists'
taste but there is no doubt that Balkin's procedure involves a
conceptually prior historical project in the first instance.
To generalize only somewhat, originalists seem to agree that
first-order debates about constitutional interpretation are questions for history. This has all kinds of benefits, which is why
originalism is attractive to so many: It is parsimonious; it gives us
ground to debate hard questions at some remove from our personal political and moral preferences; it may keep judges in
check so they don't impose their preferences upon us; it may allow our confirmation battles to be less explosive (assuming everyone bought in); 3 and it may be the best way (or only way!) to
11. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of Faint-Iearted
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (21(06).
12.

See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 118-31 (20(4).

Barnett draws from and employs terminology developed by KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING

(2(101).
13. 1 must say that I've always found this particular argument difficult to understand. If there were an interpretive consensus around any theory of constitutional interpretation, confirmation hearings might be simplified. But even supposing originalism became the only credible interpretive approach, people would still occasionally deploy it
differently, rely on different histories, and reach different results. Our two most committed originalists on the Supreme Court, Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas,
deploy the theory differently-and some of the debates among originalists can be just as
heated as the disputes between the originalists and the living constitutionalists. If one
needs a recent example, watching Barnett try to boot Scalia from the originalist camp is
especially fun. See Barnett, supra note 11. Perhaps Barnett will help purify the originalist
camp in the long run; if he does, Balkin likely won't be admitted to it. Indeed, Balkin's
account looks a bit like a modified and more history-friendly version of the "underlying
principles" approach Barnett has recently dismissed. See id at 19-22. Yet, for some rcason I can't quite figure out, Barnett goes a bit soft on Balkin in his contribution to this
Symposium. See Randy Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405
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get at the very meaning of the text itself.'4 This is why some
originalists think originalism is simply the pragmatic choice: it is,
perhaps, a lesser evil, there is no good and coherent competitor,
and democratic legislatures and social movements will function
better if we embrace its elegant minimalism.
It bears repeating, I think, that although originalists are unified about first-order interpretation that draws upon the history
and historical sources surrounding ratification, there are certainly intramural disagreements among the originalists about
what sorts of considerations may legitimately be considered at
the "back end," once a meaning or original principle is derived
historically. Indeed, Balkin invites us to see constitutional interpretation as a two-stage process (text and principles, then application and implementation) -and all originalists give history
pride of place at the first stage. From there, there are some divergences about application: decision-makers occasionally
smuggle doctrine, consequences, prudence, construction with a
"liberty presumption," practice, and political morality through
the back door to keep originalism palatable or to translate its
historical commands for our time. Although some originalists
deny that there can be any gap between the first order inquiry
and ultimate constitutional decision-making, it cannot easily be
denied that many originalists depart from their first-order inquiry after excavating some "original meaning." Because Balkin
clearly prioritizes history in his first order inquiry into "text and
principles," the originalists should welcome him to their team.'5
Living constitutionalists, by contrast, trade in a different
currency. They simply do not privilege history (of ratification) in
constitutional interpretation. They don't necessarily sideline
text, history, and structure; these are just parts of the motley
constellation that is constitutional interpretation. Balkin is undoubtedly right that living constitutionalists are particularly con(207).
14. Whcthcr and how well originalists accomplish thcsc dcsidcrata is an ongoing
convcrsation that I will not try to summarize or capturc here.
15. I conccdc that most probably don't think about constitutional interpretation as
a two-stcp process. Indeed, Barnett has called the "back end" stage "construction"-and
would constrain when and how construction may supplement interpretation. One of thc
nice innovations of Balkin's rich paper is that hc invites us to think in this fruitful way.
For those unwilling to see interpretation through this Icns, howcver, I could probably run a very similar argument by focusing upon the relative weight originalists give certain modalities as compared to the living constitutionalists. And it would still bc the case
that Balkin's privileging of history at the principlc-dcrivation stage puts him closer to the
originalists. In any case, I actually believe that looking at interpretation through the twostep makes thc diffcrcnces I want to highlight clearcr, so I stick with it in the text above.
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cerned with the "dead hand of the past" controlling the present
generation."' But precisely because they are, they cannot be content with Balkin's methodology: original meaning originalismeven Balkin's kind that allows contemporary translations on the
"back end"-gives pride of place to the very dead hand living
constitutionalists are convinced we must resist to maintain the
document's present-day legitimacy. 7 Originalists either bracket
the problem of the document's legitimacy, evade the basic question of the document's legitimacy, or are content that they have
come up with some account that takes this question off the table.
Living constitutionalists just can't get over it; the anxiety about
legitimacy is always present and pervasive."' And Balkin is no
longer anxious or pessimistic about the legitimacy of the document."' Indeed, he is cheerful and optimistic.
Living constitutionalists are plagued by anxiety about the
dead hand of the past-and think we need to update and affirm
the document's underlying principles if it is to be binding on
anyone living today. The fixation on the dead hand of the past is
not a mere motto but a mood with real interpretive consequences. To be sure, no one loses sight of the fact that it is a
written document-a fact which itself has some interpretive
16. See Letter from Thomas Jeffcrson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 392 (Julian P. Boyd & William H. Gains, Jr. cds.,
1958) ("the earth belongs in usufruct to the living;" "The question whether one generation of men has a right to hind another, seems never to have been started either on this
or our side of the water."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kcrcheval (July 12,
1816), in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 552, 561) (Merrill D. Peterson cd., 1975)
("Each generation is as independent as the one preceding, as that was of all which had
gonc before. It has then, like them, a riglit to choose for itself the form of govcrnment it
believe most promotive of its own happiness ... ").
17. For an example of a living constitutionalist resisting the dead hand, see Ackerman, supra note 4. In particular, Ackerman questions whether the structure of the basic
document makes any sense in our time. The Constitution, he argues, envisions citizens
being citizens of states first and the nation only second. Today's citizens, by contrast, arc
Americans first and Vermonters only second. Id. at 1749-51. Although he doesn't quite
speak in the language of anxicty I employ here, he does not assume away constitutional
legitimacy in his interpretive mcthodology-and precisely because he doesn't, his intcrprctive mechanics do not privilege original meaning. Id at 1776-77. For Ackerman, special statutes may be admitted in the first stage of interpretation to derive and understand
the very principles themselves. Id. at 1812.
18. It is possible, ,if course, that different parts of the Constitution elicit different
levels of the anxiety. The Preamble's substantial generalities may, perhaps, rest on a diffeient footing than the specificitics or the amendment provisions.
19. For a new statement of pessimism about the document, see SANFORD
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES
WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (21)116). Although he claims that
nothing in the book is to be taken as relevant to a theory of constitutional interpretation,
id. at 23, it is hard to imagine that such pessimism and anxiety is irrelevant to the practice
(If interpretation. Indeed, I think it underwrites living constitutionalism itself.
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ramifications. But living constitutionalists insist that the legitimacy of the document cannot be fully defended if our first-order
approach to it draws exclusively upon the historical. This requires that at the first-order level of constitutional interpretation
and first-order derivation of the document's underlying principles themselves much more than history must be in play. The entire matrix of the various modalities of constitutional interpretation is fair game to enable an authentic dynamicism that can
contribute to contemporary legitimacy. One cannot mollify the
living constitutionalist merely by telling her, as Balkin does, that
the document can achieve some flexibility and adaptability
through some broadly-phrased clauses here and there.
To state it slightly differently, it is only our Constitution because it is suffused with and supported by contemporary assent.
But living constitutionalists do not pledge faith (as Balkin's "text
and principles" approach requires) before interpretation gets off
the ground. Living constitutionalists demand that the living's
views and expectations be reflected in the principles of the
document itself; their needs cannot be deferred for the later
"application and implementation" stage of constitutional interpretation. Without an effort to tether the contemporary generation's consent to the document and its principles, it might ultimately be legitimate to abandon it altogether. That threat is very
real for the living constitutionalist, who can revere and venerate
the document only when it is unmoored from its original meaning-or, perhaps, only when the Preamble is taken to announce
the underlying principles for the whole document at a very high
level of generality.
Although some living constitutionalists might prefer more
regular constitutional conventions to help the process of legitimation, most living constitutionalists don't want to abandon the
document altogether. They can generally concede with Balkin
that the living have undeniable connections with the dead-that
we share a collective memory and fate with them. Yet, a living
constitutionalist insists that the document is only ours when our
consent to it today is something other than completely fictive.
Therefore, any first-order constitutional interpretation that pre20. Originalists routinely point to the document's "writtenncss" and amendment
provisions to argue against an evolving Constitution. See, e.g., Diarmuid O'Scannlain,
Today's Senate ConfirmationBattles and the Role of the FederalJudiciary, 27 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 169, 179 (2(113). Writtcnncss and the possibility of repeal and modification,
however, doesn't necessarily preclude dynamic interpretation. See William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1481 (1987).
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vents the full range of interpretive modalities from destabilizing
original meaning risks betraying the entire "social contract."
This is a key to living constitutionalism and, in turn, the key that
locks Balkin out of the club.
In summary, a core difference between the originalists and
the living constitutionalists turns on what we might call interpretative mechanics-and Balkin aligns himself with the originalist
form. Originalists exclude many "extrinsic" constitutional modalities in their first pass at any particular constitutional question; living constitutionalists let it all in from the start. Discussions of consequences, underlying principles of political
morality, prudence, doctrine, rule of law considerations: all these
are relevant (even if not, perhaps, equally relevant) for living
constitutionalists at the first moment that a question of constitutional interpretation presents itself. Originalists either rule these
considerations out of the interpretive game entirely or admit
them only in later conceptual stages of the interpretive enterprise.
Many people would have no trouble with originalist mechanics because they take for granted that the document is binding. Without anxiety about the basic legitimacy of the document
and the original principles it embodies, originalists can keep a lot
of questions and considerations at bay in the first stage of interpretation. Perhaps if we agree that the document has inherent
bindingness, one can reasonably argue that the document's
meaning is revealed in the first instance as a question of history.
Living constitutionalists can and do offer theories of meaning to contest this last supposition; they argue that meaning itself
requires dynamic interpretation. But that debate is not my core
concern here because much more is at stake in constitutional interpretation than a debate about linguistic meaning; constitutional interpretation is a social practice of legitimation for the
living constitutionalist. Nor is my central interest here the empirical question about which interpretive mechanics better describe actual constitutional argumentation and constitutional
politics in state and society. 2'
21. Indeed, originalism (cvcn of Balkin's form) may sccm like an undesirable theory because it just doesn't scem like a good positive account of what people (whether
sccn as "the people," judges, social movements, or law professors) arc contesting in constitutional politics and constitutional discourse. They aren't necessarily having a debate
about history in the first instancc-even if they acknowledge that history is an important
factor or modality in the interpretive project too. It is hard to sec much of the debate
about abortion in particular as an cflort to uncovcr historical principles and apply them
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Rather, my central concern is what I think motivates and
animates living constitutionalism's interpretative mechanics.
Conceding the fundamental bindingness of the document when
confronted with every question of constitutional interpretation
(as many originalists, including Balkin must do) impliedly rejects
the living constitutionalist's preference that constitutional interpretation and adjudication should, every time constitutional dialogue gets off the ground, re-ask in the first instance the question
of the very legitimacy of the document as our social contract today.
To be sure, the instability implied by constitutional politics
and constitutional interpretation with such high stakes is daunting. It can even seem subversive, unsettling what we think of as
an especially important part of constitutional government: restraining majoritarianism and protecting certain rights from everyday political contest.2 The consequent messiness, seeming lack
of discipline, purported lack of fidelity (and actual lack of faith
from time to time), disrespect for the document, and too substantial delegation to the judiciary likely go a long way in explaining why living constitutionalism is unattractive to so many.
It is part of why Balkin feels the need to distance himself from
this seemingly antinomian orientation. But it will satisfy only a
few living constitutionalists to be handed some vague clauses
that can be updated easily. 3 This just isn't enough to make the
in our time; at its core it is a debate about very fundamental questions of political and
personal morality. Those engaging in these debates may be surprised to learn that they
have to read the Congressional Record to justify their positions.
Living constitutionalism, by contrast, can perhaps make better sense of the positive
reality of constitutional discourse; this is especially so when we focus on constitutional
interpretation by citizens, whom Balkin puts at the core of his theory of constitutional
interpretation. Citizens are probably much worse than judges at limiting their discourse
to history in deriving "text and principles," which Balkin's originalism requires.
22. 1 tend to think this critique against living constitutionalism, although commonly
heard, misunderstands and oversimplifies the political project of constitutionalism. But
this is hardly the place for such an argument.
23. Gillman's account of living constitutionalism in Gillman, supra note 7, sometimes reads as if Balkin's distinction between "original expected application" and "original meaning" might do the trick. See id. at 221 (highlighting the separation of "principles" from "the particular means" the framers used to realize them), id. at 222-23
(invoking Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)), id.
at 231 (invoking a statement of living constitutionalism by FDR). But there is much in
Gillman's summary of living constitutionalism's advocates that is not as easy to reconcile
with Balkin. See id. at 222-25 (drawing upon Brandeis's idea that interpretation might
"ignore[ the expressed will of the sovereign in favor of an imagined set of aspirational
goals" that arc barely expressed in the document itself and explaining the result in Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaidsdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) as justiliable only if the very
basic principles expressed in the document are subject to radical reinterpretation), id.at
235-36 (discussing Corwin's explicit rejection or "fidelity to tradition" and his belief that
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living constitutionalists happy and get them to stop pestering us
with their questions that go to the very core of our practice of
constitutionalism.
Living constitutionalism takes the threat of basic illegitimacy very seriously. Although the document needn't be considered profane,24 neither can it be treated as sacred.25 Our civic life
together is not a religious covenantal community that requires
adherence to our governing document just because it happens to
exist and happens to help constitute us as a people. The document and our life under it always stands in need of moral, practical, and political justification-and living constitutionalism always requires us to ask for that justification at the very moment
when we ask for the meaning of the document and its provisions.
This is why living constitutionalists cannot give history pride of
place and require a much more eclectic approach to first-order
inquiries in its interpretive mechanics. Balkin assumes a faith
that living constitutionalists think needs to be earned through
the interpretive process itself."r
the meaning ol" the Constitution itself must change with time), id. at 236 (highlighting
Corwin's insistence that the document must gain authority only from the living).
This tension within Gillman's account obviously highlights that living constitutionalism is a big umbrella-and surely some will be able to live with Balkin's original meaning
originalism. But I would guess that most of them, if thcy were honest, would not for the
reasons I spccify here: his interpretative mechanics and mood are originalist.
It may be that living constitutionalists would find it dangerous and embarrassing to
admit their psychological condition. But I think my analysis here should nevertheless
help explain why they will have trouble embracing Balkin's account.
24. The classic invocation here is William Lloyd Garrison's view of the Constitution
as "A Covenant with Death and an Agrcement with Hell." See William Lloyd Garrison,
THE LIBERATOR, May 6, 1842, at 3.
25. See MCBAIN, supra note 7, at 272 (arguing that the Constitution "was not
handed down on Mount Sinai by the Lord God of Hosts. It is not revealed law. It is no
final cause"). I concede that some living constitutionalists cannot help themselves and
resort to calling the Constitution sacred text. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 4, at 175253 . Although I don't see this mctaphor as appropriate for an honest living constitutionalism, a weak form o' textualism is potentially consistent with living constitutionalism. For
more on how that might work, see infra.
26. The deepest work analyzing faith in the Constitution is SANFORD LEVINSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). There, one can surely see on display the sort of agnosticism, ambivalence, and demand for legitimacy I am attributing to living constitutionalism. Although Levinson once pledged a tortured faith in that early work, he no longer
would be willing to sign the document himself. See LEVINSON, supra note 19, at 5. Back
when Balkin was a living constitutionalist, one could see him embracing Levinsonian
anxiety about constitutional faith:
Law offers us the promise of justice without ever making good on that promise
in full. That is why the most basic problem of jurisprudence is the problem of
faith in law; and the most basic question in jurisprudence is the question to what
extent our faith in law is justified. At the heart of law, and the philosophy of
law, lies the problem of faith and idolatry.
.lack M. Balkin, Idolatry and Faith: Te Jurisprudenceof Sandy Levinson, 38 TULSA L.
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Admittedly, it is somewhat unfashionable these days to believe that political obligation, our obligation to obey the law of
the Constitution, stems from any social contract theory of the
traditional liberal form. Still, underlying many versions of both
originalism and living constitutionalism remains some view that
the Constitution's legitimacy as binding law derives, in part,
from its role as our organizing social contract. 7 To say, as some
do, 2X that it binds only our government and our officials-who
themselves swear an oath to it to renew its bindingness 2 -evades
the most basic reality that the Constitution plays a central role in
all of our political lives. Accordingly, when looking for the assent
or consent of the governed to legitimate the document, it is not
terribly uncommon to think of the Constitution in contract law
terms (even though the analogy falls apart in many different
ways)) Randy Barnett has done the most to use contract theory
to help underwrite originalism and its quest to quiet the anxious
question of the "dead hand" distressing the living constitutionalists.' But I think some contract ideas may also be marshaled on
REV. 553, 577 (2003). For his original meaning originalism, Balkin has had to leave his
worrics about constitutional idolatry behind-with the living constitutionalists.
27. BARNETT, supra note 12, is a notable-and very interesting-exccption. I very
much doubt he squares the circle of legitimacy with his alternative to popular sovereignty. But his originalism displays the very confidence in legitimacy I have ascribed to
that group of constitutional theorists. In some ways, originalism is driven by the fear of'
the consequences of taking the possibility of illegitimacy seriously; it represses the problem to cope with the fear. See id. at 5 (warning that rejecting originalism may lead to disorder because we might have to conclude that "no one lis! behind the curtain and
[judges'I commands ar utterly devoid of binding authority").
28. E.g., id.at 12.
29. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has written, "blur constitutional order does not
depend on hypothetical contracts. There are actual contracts. Like other judges, I took
an oath to support and enforce both the laws and the Constitution. That is to say, I made
a promise-a contract." Frank Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1119,1122 (1998).
31). Among the most important ways (that may dissuade us from pursuing this thin
analogy at all) is that contracts require actual assent among parties, something that we
can never hope for in constitutional politics. There are many other forceful objcctions to
pursuing this analogy as well. See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM,
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY 82-142 (2003); Trevor W. Morrison, Lamenting
Lochner's Loss: Randy Barnett's Case for a Libertarian Constitution, 910CORNELL L.
REV. 839 (2(105).
31. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalismsfor Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. REV.
611 (1999). Contract theory has also been marshaled to defend a particular set of propositions about constitutional interpretation in David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History:
Alexander Hamilton, the Federalist, and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755, 756
(20100); and Easterbrook, supra note 29.
As it turns out, Barnett views "popular sovereignty" as an implausible account of the
Constitution's legitimacy. See generally BARNET', supra note 12, at 11-52. And his helpfuldiscussion suggests that even contract principles may be unwelcome because of the
difficulty of finding anything resembling "consent" to the contract. This doesn't, as it
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the side of the interpretive theory preferred by living constitutionalism.
If we were to indulge the analogy for a moment, perhaps
what is most notable about our constitutional contract is that it is
very difficult to modify-and that there is virtually no negotiating over the written terms by the living. It is a form contract, a
classic "contract of adhesion."32 The terms are offered on a
"take-it-or-leave-it basis" and the "only alternative to complete
adherence is outright rejection."3
Yet it is still more disturbing than a mere consumer contract
of adhesion because unlike some objective manifestations of assent that routinely precede formation in most form contracting,
there is precious little most citizens do to manifest assent. Some
of our officers take oaths to uphold the Constitution-and for
these people it is, perhaps, much more similar to a classic consumer contract. But for most citizens whose lives are affected by
and organized by the Constitution, there are only very attenuated manifestations of assent, some of which are produced, perhaps, under coercion. Citizens may pay taxes to the constitutionally sanctioned government and may follow many of the laws
promulgated by those given authority through the Constitution's
provisions. But these activities may just as easily be the product
of coercion-the threat of being jailed-rather than affirmative
assent to the social contract. Voting is more voluntaristic, of
course, but we needn't manifest any allegiance to the process:
We partake because the results of elections will control us anyway. In short, consent to our central contract of adhesion is extremely attenuated.
A living constitutionalist might look to some theorists of
form contracts to see if there are any special interpretive rules
that might govern such instruments. Randy Barnett's theory of
form contracting 34-a relatively adhesion-friendly theory, to

turns out, prevent Barnett from resorting to contract theory to underwrite originalism.
32. Some further discussion of this idea (in a different context) can be found in
Alex Kozinski & Harry Susman, Original Mean[der]ings,49 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 159816011 (1997). They address whether the ratifiers themselves could be bound by the adhesive nature of thc Constitution. One critical problem they identify-which applies to rny
use of the analogy too-is that the idea is somewhat anachronistic. As they note, "Ithe
term 'contract of adhesion' did not appcar in the United States until 1919." 1d. at 1599
n.1i8. But living constitutionalists are freed from the difficulties of anachronism, perhaps, because they don't see themselves as bound by the original intent of original intent.
33. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 312 (2d ed. 1990).
34. See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORD. L. REV. 627
(21 02).
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boot -highlights a few special limitations of adhesion contracts.
First, an actual manifestation of assent is important to trigger enforceability. We seem to lack that manifestation with respect to
most citizens and, accordingly, the enforceability of the contract
becomes a source of debate and anxiety in the very first instance.
Even if we could bracket that hurdle (and to get the interpretive project off the ground, the living constitutionalist may
need to concede that some general assent to some basic text may
be implied), Barnett insists that we can never commit through a
form contract "to violate the rights of others or... transfer or
waive an inalienable right."35 Accordingly, there may be a
"higher law" that doesn't itself derive from the Constitution.
This "higher law" can constrain the terms in a contract of adhesion. More, the "higher law" supplied by political morality more
generally might be imagined to vary with the times. That is so
because formation under the adhesive contract happens anew
for each citizen, triggering a new baseline set of inalienable
rights conferred by our renewed sense of justice in each generation.
Together, these contract ideas can help living constitutionalists explain both why they are terribly anxious about legitimacy
in the first instance and why they think fundamental principles of
political morality and ethics are always in play when taking to
the task of interpreting our constitutional contract of adhesion.
There are ways out of the 3"higher law" of the dead if a "higher
law" of the living trumps it. 6
There is more to the analogy, too. It is routine in form contracting to construe any ambiguities that arise in interpretation
and construction against the drafter. To be sure, clear, conspicuous, and especially visible terms in a contract of adhesion are often enforceable." But as soon as any ambiguity arises, the con35. Id. at 637.
36. Much of Brucc Ackcrman's carccr can bc sccn as an cffort to specify conditions
for "higher lawmaking" outside of the document's formal amendment procedures, see,
e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266-94 (1991), which themselves arc arguably unconscionable given the reality of what it takes to modify the document formally. The "usage of trade" on practices of constitutional amendment in thc
world community reveals the American constitution to bc the single most difficult Constitution in cxistencc to amend. See Donald Lutz, Toward a Formal Theory of Constitu-

tional Amendment,

in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237,261 (Sanford Lcvinson cd., 1995); LEVINSON, supra
note 19, at 204 n.29 (discussing Lutz and the Yugoslav Constitution, which was harder to
amend when it cxistcd). This unconscionability may hc yet another reason living constitutionalists arc much more open to non-Article V amcndmcnt.
37. See generally Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction,
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sumer under the adhesive contract will likely be able to have the
contract construed to her benefit and against the drafter. As one
court put it, "if some substantive provision of [an] agreement is
fairly susceptible of a certain construction and the contractor actually and reasonably so construes it, in the course of.. . performance, that is the interpretation which will be adopted. '5
Finally-and most pertinent to the potential for living constitutionalists to draw from the concept of the contract of adhesion to explicate their interpretive principles-contracts of adhesion can be limited to consumers' "reasonable expectations. '
Terms are not to be interpreted to "exceed some bound of reasonableness."" To be sure, usually when courts construe adhesion contracts in light of "reasonable expectations," the relevant
expectations are measured as of the time of formation. 1 But
"formation" in the case of the Constitution is happening over
and over again with each new living citizen that is drawn into the
contract. So we must transpose the doctrine to help us interpret
the document upon implementation and enforcement as well. As
the Supreme Court wrote in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 2
"clauses contained in form ... contracts [of adhesion] are subject
to... scrutiny for fundamental fairness." Thus, interpreters are
given a somewhat free hand to legitimize form contracts by policing for fundamental fairness. Barnett's motto seems particularly apt: "We must never forget that it is a form contract [we
are] expounding.""
To be fair, not all courts and commentators embrace the
principles of interpretation for contracts of adhesion that I discuss here.4 Still, seeing the Constitution for the kind of social
96 HARV. L. REv. 1173 (1983). Perhaps here is where the living constitutionalist can cede
somcthing to a purc textualism: The President must be 35 years old because it is crystal
clear (and doesn't, perhaps, ofrend inalienable rights)-and only limited general assent
seems to be required for such a clear provision. For more on the distinction between
general assent and specific assent in form contracts, sec KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 3711 (1961)).

38. WPC Enter., Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874, 876 (1963).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, cmts. c- (1981).
410. Barnett, supra note 34, at 638.
41. See, e.g., Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration,and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 38-39 (1991).
42. 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991).
43. Barnett, supra note 34, at 639.
44. Judge Eastcrbrook seems willing, for example, to enforce any provision of a
contract ol adhesion as long as it isn't unconscionable. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidcnbcrg, 86
F.3d 1447 (1996); Hill v. Gateway 21)11, Inc., 115 F.3d 1147 (1997). Moreover, Barnett
actually embraces these Eastcrbrook decisions and aims to limit the broad reasonable
expectations doctrine of cases like C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Muttual Insurance Co.,
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contract that it is recommends particular interpretive principles.
If the Constitution is a contract of adhesion, we should, in our
very first pass at interpretation and construction: (1) investigate
the type of assent we can justifiably ascribe to citizens; (2) enforce bits of text that are plain, uncontroversial, and particularly
clear; (3) construe ambiguous phrases against the "drafter" and
in favor of those who are assenting today; 45 (4) protect the kinds
of inalienable rights that the contractual document must be read
to respect (rights that can change over time as the contract reforms anew); (5) protect the reasonable expectations of today's
signatories; and (6) assess whether the document and its potential applications accord with fundamental fairness. This is a living
constitutionalism, indeed, that does not privilege history (though
history may be relevant in assessing reasonable expectations)
and takes seriously the task of legitimating the document for today's generation.4
Some final points, in conclusion. My aim here has not been
to convert anyone to living constitutionalism. I suppose one either obsesses about the inter-generational problem of constitutionalism and enables the anxiety to spill over to first-order constitutional interpretation or one doesn't. In any case, I have
probably provided at least as many reasons to reject living constitutionalism as I have reasons to embrace it. It is hard, perhaps,
to fault those who don't trust judges with life tenure or even the
people themselves to undertake such a complicated interpretive
project."
227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975) to thc "radically unexpected." Thcrc is probably an important difference bctwccn thosc who want to cnforcc the "rcasonablc cxpcctations" of thc
consumcr and thosc who want to enforce all of the contract and any of its applications
that aren't radically uncxpectcd. Barnett givcs us as much reason to embrace the former,
however, as hc does to embracc the lattcr. In any case, it is possible that the amcndmcnt
provisions ol the Constitution arc unconscionablc, see Ackcrman, supra note 36, rendering non-Article V amendmcnt pcrfectly constitutional aftcr all.
45. When Kozinski and Susman considcrcd the analogy, thcy assumed that the
draftcr against whom the ambiguous provisions might nccd to bc construed is thc fcderal
govcrnment. See Kozinski & Susman, supra notc 32, at 1598-99. But we could just as casily imagine that ambiguities need to be construed against the authors and ratificrs of the
original text who purported to bind future generations through a form contract.
46. The Hollywood pitch is something like this: Corwin meets Corbin.
47. About the issue of judicial restraint in particular, I think Balkin's remarks are
innovative and interesting-and could be incorporated into accounts of living constitutionalism. For Balkin, the constraints on judges come not from theories of constitutional
interpretation but from what he calls "institutional features of the political and legal system." Balkin, supra note 1, at 309. If living constitutionalism needs an account of judicial
rcstraint-and surely it does because the threat of illegitimacy from juristocracy is also
substantial- Balkin offers a persuasive one.
One might say that the living constitutionalist merely displaces the illegitimacy from
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My modest project here has been to highlight Balkin's failure to address fully the needs and anxieties of a living constitutionalism that is more than an anti-theoretical desire for flexibility and nice liberal results like the right to abortion. Indeed, I
fear he trivializes living constitutionalism by suggesting that he
accounts fully for its needs. By specifying some details about the
interpretive mechanics of living constitutionalism and what may
motivate those mechanics, I hope I have been able to suggest
why originalism and living constitutionalism are not, as Balkin
asserts, two sides of the same coin. Make no mistake: Balkin rejects living constitutionalism when he easily professes a faith in
basic legitimacy. Living constitutionalism accepts fidelity as one
modality of constitutional interpretation; but it doesn't have the
faith that underwrites originalism, which preaches fidelity to the
original meaning as the primary mode of interpretation.
A real question remains for the limited project I have undertaken here, however. Even if I am correct that Balkin embraces the interpretive mechanics of the originalists by dancing
their two-step and prioritizing the historical in the derivation of
principles, I still haven't shown that his resisting a full-scale confrontation with the question of the document's legitimacy in the
"first step" makes any difference to constitutional outcomes.
There may be some methodological and mechanical differences
between his form of lefty originalism and the form of living constitutionalism I describe here-but I have hardly shown that this
is a distinction that makes a real difference.' 1 I have, perhaps,
shown that the two theories have somewhat different sensibilities on a core question of interpretive methodology. But if they
can get the same results, maybe Balkin's living constitutionalist
friends won't feel abandoned, after all.
I can't fully evaluate this prospect, mostly because neither
Balkin's lefty originalism nor my reconstruction of living constithe document onto the judiciary. Perhaps. But the living constitutionalist can believe with
Balkin that the judiciary is under much more substantial control by the living than the
document itself-and the possibility ol judicial restraint (even with eclectic interpretive
mechanics) is very real.
48. Anothcr thing I have not done here is argue for any right to abortion fiom the
pcrspectivc of living constitutionalism. I have occupied myself here with much a more
th oretical agenda (and, in the process, have made some controversial claims about the
psychology of living constitutionalism). One of the great contributions of Balkin's work,
howcvcr, is that he does much more than describe his "text and principles" approach as a
matter of theory; he shows us how it works. Living constitutionalists are admittedly much
better at theory than at careful specifications of how the motley method works in practice. At the very least, Balkin's flirtation with originalism should inspire real living constitutionalists to do more to specify how their interpretive mechanics produce results.
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tutionalism (and especially the latter) are sufficiently detailed to
say with any certainty that they would regularly produce the
same results. Yet, even supposing that the two accounts would
routinely produce similar results, people surely choose their constitutional theories for reasons other than the particular outcomes they can produce on the questions of abortion, gay marriage, and affirmative action. More, just because there may be
some identity of results does not mean that we can avoid the task
of choosing which method we prefer to get them.
Finally, and most central to my themes here, living constitutionalism is a mood and an anxiety at its core; its atmospherics
are, I think, substantially different from Balkin's optimistic
originalism. So even if Balkin's originalism and living constitutionalism converge on certain outcomes, living constitutionalists
might ultimately find Balkin's disposition too cheery and alienating to keep him around. The originalists have faith; living constitutionalists are agnostics and require each generation to ask and
answer the question of constitutional legitimacy in its own voice.
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